

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700030001-2

~~World Scene - Change in our outlook on International Relations~~

Optimism - ~~Perhaps over optimism~~ of year ago on detente - gone -
~~instead~~ *Since then*

Mid East War, Energy Crisis, set back in U.S. Economy.

Skepticism - questioning how all going so well with old opponent -

Problem - were over-optimistic
 so many problems at home -
 - Why over-optimistic?

Looked at detente only from our point of view - American point
 of view.

Assumed Soviet view was same

- U.S. viewpoint - 2 reasons for detente:

Rational - Emotional

1

First, Rational *Emotional*

(1) tension plus

vast stocks nuclear weapons on both sides - equals Dangerous
 situation.

Also, was rational because:

(2) No unfulfilled needs or ambitions that require competition with
 Soviets.

Perfectly happy to forego/not take advantage *competition* of

Even think willing to take calculated risk. Because Do not fear
USSR, despite Cold War years.

Partly because: superior militarily and economically all those years.

Partly because: 150 years not attacked/invaded at home. No
 tradition of having to fight on own soil.

Can T. Has original card
 3/20/74

Second reason - emotional - stemmed from revulsion to Vietnam

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- opportunity to avoid war - to step farther back from the threshold of war.

- alternate use of \$

- pushed emotionally into detente

Did same conditions exist in Soviet Union?

Emotional? No - public opinion not allowed to give emotional thrust to policy.

Rational? - Reasons - same as ours?

1. Same concern over nuclear stockpiles and hair-trigger.

Beyond that - no

3

2. Soviet homeland invaded repeatedly. Wary of entrusting future to another's goodwill or intentions.

3. Soviets clearly have external ambitions.

- in part from ideological belief that until capitalism suppressed everywhere, it will be aggressive. Threat to Communist Philosophy.

- in part have external ambitions. Haven't been global power we have in past 30 years.

- We humiliated them - from their point of view in Lebanon-58.

Cuba & Berlin-62- Real confrontation they backed down.

N. Vietnam-72- mining Haiphong. Another loss of face before their allies.

4

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· Today feel the need to compete, to prove the worth of their system
Evidence they are striving hard for global power status - Emerging from being the traditional continental power, to a maritime power able to project power around globe - not just ground power across land frontiers. The Soviets are well aware that the successful world powers of recent history have projected their power from a maritime base. Why with these objectives did the Soviets elect to participate in Detente?

5

1. We wanted to play that game. After all militarily there are only 2 super powers - The Soviets must do the power waltz with us.
2. At the same time economically and politically the world has been evolving toward multi-polarity.

Thus, detente opened up some tactical opportunities for the Soviets - through easing pressure on one front while dealing with China on other. Musn't forget serious USSR - PRC differences - Easy to forget we are not only focus of Soviet attentions.

3. Opened possibilities for solving some domestic problems - for trade and technology.

6

Therefore, Detente means something different to each of us

Without casting accusations of distingenuousness/malevolence/false intent.

- simply had different reasons. Not necessarily incompatible with each.

I believe CCs
Could work to both our advantages; Basically it means to Soviets not cessation of competition, but shifting competition to non-military arenas.

- must expect continued competition with USSR.

- must expect Soviets to look for weaknesses and capitalize on them.
often means rushing in or overreacting when situations appear.

- did in mid east when going well for Egypt and Syria.

7

Anaology to faithfulness to wife *easy* when no opportunity.

Want to trust
We must not provide Soviets opportunities.

In part means continued diplomatic efforts.

political
In part that means remaining militarily strong. *often difficult to understand*
stand need for strong military in peacetime. *yet military serves diplomatic*
functions in peacetime. It provides leverage in world affairs and demands that possible adversaries carefully consider consequences of their actions.

Peacetime deterrence then is a question of the impression our military forces create

On Soviets

On others may be tempted tamper with our interests,
indirectly perhaps

Even impression friends/allies

1. *Principal problems military face*
in remaining strong today is numerous
pressures to buy more & more
sophisticated equipment.
*Indirectly leads to smaller
forces -*
F-4 / F-14
What are these pressures?

In that regard ^{we} all are aware of pressures to withdraw forces from overseas
bases.

Will place more emphasis on naval forces which can be dispatched - around
globe - Premium on numbers of forces -

Principal problems military face today
Lot pressures in opposite direction

1. Fixation on big war - *Conventional conflict*

Greatest risk

Natural tendency of military men

2. *drawn idea can fight enemy with soph*
Idea big war - sophisticated enemy demands expensive
sophisticated systems *only by matching*

3. *Cost of sophisticated hardware - driving # units downward*

4. Mobilization philosophy

Have the sophisticated - mass produce rest

1. No time to mobilize

Few mass production items anyway -

Even simplest of ships

e.g. electronic components

Computers - software

2. Preparing big war and assuming others lesser included - cases not necessarily best. Admittedly most vital - but least likely.

May find pressure has shifted and we could lose by default.

Alternative preparing more likely smaller wars and aggregating.

Issue of not letting enemy shift focus of competition.

*Think he is doing -
man time approach*

11

3. Whether concentrate on large or small question whether meeting sophisticated enemy does require "best" of everything.

Putting all eggs in one basket dangerous

Aggregate many, less capable, less flexible units may be greater productivity -

Especially due vulnerability to surprise attack.

4. The best in sophistication also has disadvantages

Lose in reliability and availability what hope to gain in capability

Lose capability because can not train people to operate

Trained manpower areas cost *you*

Industry - Draft

reverse these pressures for big and best:

- 1) Inclination of military men to take brute force to more of what attempted before and no longer works.
- 2) Inclination of industry and the military to get what technology can produce whether need we it or not.

1. In our military bureaucaracy - R&D people don't have many incentives to curb research and development.

Project managers incentives . . .

2. In industry often ~~need prove some new capability to get contract.~~

13

New tactic or adaptation of something old -
not profitable.

Degree to which industry tempted to oversell
technology will be a short term benefit

We won't have \$

We won't have people maintain and operate.

- Industry must convince the military to buy only what it needs, not buy because it's the newest, latest technology, etc.
- Some complex equipment will always be needed, but the trend is more toward lo-mix and demand will be more for simple, maintainable equipment. Those companies who have gone that route will prosper in long run.

*Carb on
effects*

Labre representation

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Even impression friends/allies

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Deterrent impact of military force - more difficult to understand than
is warfighting potential. Not only for civilians but also for military.

- Warfighting -

Hardware

Tactics Basics of our trade

Morale

- Deterrence -

Psychological

Perceptions

"Mind-reading"

Want to be sure opponents do not mis-read intent - important our
capabilities be evident.

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In that regard all are aware of pressures to withdraw forces from overseas
bases.

Will place more emphasis on naval forces which can be dispatched - around
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Lot pressures in opposite direction

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Greatest risk,

Natural tendency of military men

2. Idea big war - sophisticated enemy demands expensive
sophisticated systems

3. Cost of sophisticated hardware - driving # units downward

4. Mobilization philosophy

Have the sophisticated - mass produce rest

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All these pressure wrong

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Trained manpower areas cost

Industry - Draft

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Would suggest

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